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Since beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially
assist EU member states in taxpayer-funded bail-outs. These crisis resolutions are often accompanied
by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels.
The question of how to resolve failing financial institutions under which economic preconditions is
therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance. In this work we employ
an agent-based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant
crisis resolution mechanisms. To establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a
series of key stylized facts if the financial and real economy. The distressed institution can either
be closed via a purchase & assumption transaction, it can be bailed-out using taxpayer money,
or it may be bailed-in in a debt-to-equity conversion. We find that for an economy characterized
by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial
stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution. For economies in recession
with high unemployment the bail-in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism.
Under no circumstances do taxpayer-funded bail-out schemes outperform bail-ins with private sector
involvement.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2013 Cyprus became the epicenter of finan-
cial turmoil in what would become the 2012-2013 Cypriot
financial crisis. The crisis gained momentum in the wake
of the Greek government-debt crisis, when Cypriot banks
were exposed to haircuts of up to 50% in 2011 and the
state was unable to raise liquidity from the markets to
support its financial sector [1]. In March 2013 bonds is-
sued by Cyprus were downgraded to Junk status, which
disqualified them from being accepted as collateral at the
European Central Bank [2]. Consequently the Cypriot
government requested financial aid from the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) [3]. What followed
was an unprecedented, international struggle about who
has to pay for the losses incurred by a national bank-
ing crisis. The EU and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) replied to Cyprus’ request by proposing a e10
billion deal, including a 6.7% one-time bank deposit levy
for deposits up to e100,000, and 9.9% for higher deposits
on all national bank accounts [1]. Despite being on the
verge of financial collapse, large demonstrations and po-
litical upheaval led the Cypriot parliament to reject this
proposal [4]. The situation was finally resolved by ap-
proving a plan to restructure the second largest Cypriot
bank into a bad bank and to guarantee all deposits below
e100,000, but to levy all higher uninsured deposits [1].
In the case of Cyprus the EU-IMF originally proposed
to resolve the banking crisis by a bail-out, i.e. by forcing
all taxpayers or depositors in the country to participate
in the e10 billion loan. As a result of political turmoil,
this plan was altered such that only depositors at the
failing bank were forced to participate in the deal. This
took the form of a balance sheet restructuring, a debt-to-
equity conversion. This type of crisis resolution was the
first realization of a so-called bail-in [5]. The ’bail-out
versus bail-in’ debate, i.e. which crisis resolution outper-
forms the other in terms of fostering financial stability
and overall economic output and growth, has been in full
swing since then [6, 7]. Proponents of bail-ins often cite
the moral hazard problem of bail-outs, i.e. the incentive
to take risks for systemically important financial insti-
tutions (SIFI) when others (taxpayers) will have to pay
eventual losses [6]. On the other hand, bail-ins are criti-
cized for providing a channel for contagion risks from the
failing institution to its investors, as has been pointed
out in the discussion surrounding the resolution of the
Austrian Hypo Alpe-Adria bank [8]. After all, it was a
debt restructuring in the Greek banking sector similar to
a bail-in which triggered the crisis in Cyprus [1]. It is fi-
nally also unclear under which circumstances an orderly
liquidation of a troubled bank would be preferable over
both, bail-outs and bail-ins [9].
The Cypriot financial crisis is only one in a series of
examples for a banking crisis which blurred the lines be-
tween bank bail-outs and sovereign bail-outs. For ex-
ample, following the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, the US treasury department disbursed loans
of a combined volume of $204.9 billion (b) among 707
banks in the Capital Purchase Program, of which $16.7b
are still outstanding [10]. In Europe, the EFSF dis-
bursed loans of e52b to Portugal e41b to Ireland in 2011
[11, 12]. The first and second Greek bail-out consisted
of tranches of about e110b each. Spain received a loan
of e41.4b in 2012-2013. In addition, the IMF also pro-
vided billions of loans as financial aid to European na-
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2tions, e48.1b to Greece, e9.1b to Hungary, e22.5b to
Ireland, e26b to Portugal, and e12.6b to Romania. As
a result of the 2008 financial crisis the combined bail-out
volume in EU member states totals almost half a trillion
Euro [11, 12]. These bail-outs are typically accompa-
nied by strict austerity programs causing political and
social friction on both domestic and international lev-
els. The question of how to resolve a failing SIFI is ulti-
mately a question about maintaining financial, economic
and political stability on a supranational scale. The per-
formance of financial crisis resolution mechanisms has to
be evaluated not only by ensuring financial stability, but
also by how they impact the entire economy in terms of
unemployment, economic growth, liquidity provision to
entrepreneurs, etc.
DSGE models, by now the most popular way to study
effects of policy interventions on macro-economic fluctu-
ations, generally lack interactions between the financial
sector and the real economy. There are basically three
approaches to introduce financial friction or defaults in
these models. First, in the collateral approach it is as-
sumed that borrowers are required to provide a sufficient
amount of collateral to guarantee that under no condi-
tions in the future the borrower will have to default – a
cash-in-advance constraint [13]. In the second approach
banks are assumed to be able to hedge credit risk such
that no defaults are possible at the expense of an external
financing premium [14]. In both approaches default does
not occur in equilibrium, however. In a third approach
agents are allowed to choose what fraction of their out-
standing debt to repay, and partially default on their obli-
gations in return for a default penalty [15]. This approach
introduces endogenous default rates at equilibrium. By
studying general equilibrium (GE) models which incorpo-
rate the cash-in-advance constraint and endogenous de-
fault rates, it has been shown that capital requirements
for banks effectively lead to a trade-off between financial
stability and economic efficiency [16–18]. A GE model
where households take loans from both a banking system
and a ’shadow banking system’ was recently proposed in
[19]. There it was shown that if households choose to
default on their loans, this may trigger forced selling by
the shadow banks and lead to a fire sale dynamics.
In this work we address the question of which crisis
resolution mechanisms perform optimally under given
economic circumstances. We focus on three highly rel-
evant resolution mechanisms to contribute to both the
’bail-in versus bail-out’, and the ’too-big-to-fail’ debates.
(i) The troubled financial institution or bank is liqui-
dated by a purchase & assumption (P&A) operation [20].
(ii) The bank is bailed-out using taxpayer money, or (iii)
the distressed bank is bailed-in through a debt-to-equity
conversion. In particular try to clarify which crisis res-
olution mechanisms minimize financial contagion risks,
lead to the highest liquidity provision for the economic
sector, reduce unemployment most, lead to the highest
economic output. The first, P&A resolution mechanism
corresponds to the case where the distressed financial in-
stitution defaults and is closed down. In the bail-out and
bail-in cases the distressed bank continues to operate af-
ter the crisis. This allows to investigate whether it is ben-
eficial to let the failing institution default or not. If the
troubled bank is saved, we can inquire on a quantitative
basis whether private sector involvement in the resolu-
tion plan is beneficial or not. We employ the framework
of the Mark I CRISIS model developed within the CRI-
SIS project [42]. This is an agent-based model (ABM)
framework implementing a closed economy consisting of
banks, firms, and households. These agents interact with
each other in various markets. Within this framework
and closely related models it has already been studied
how systemic risk can be reduced or eliminated via a
systemic risk transaction tax, or under different regula-
tory regimes [21, 22]. These works also emphasized the
importance of cascading spreading of credit risk within
financial or interbank networks, and how this may lead
to failures of the entire financial system [23–28]. The
CRISIS framework is especially useful for the study of
different crisis resolution mechanisms since it provides
a model for both the economic and the financial sector.
Both sectors are modeled with fine granularity and a rich
structure of inter-sector linkages, such as credit or deposit
markets [29–31]. This makes it an ideal testbed to study
the propagation of financial crises to the real economy
and vice versa, and how this is influenced by different
crisis resolution mechanisms.
In this work we address only mechanical aspects of
bank defaults and resolutions. There are no agents that
can adapt their behavior to the given regulatory regime.
For instance, we do not include the moral hazard prob-
lem, i.e. that the knowledge of being bailed-out in finan-
cial distress induces additional risk-taking behavior by
banks. We also do not address the case of mixed crisis
resolution strategies, such as letting banks default par-
tially. Each bank in the model follows the same strategy.
Hence there is also no long-term growth in the model
generated by evolutionary culling banks with bad strate-
gies, as envisaged in Schumpeter’s concept of creative
destruction [32, 33].
CRISIS RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
We focus on three highly relevant crisis resolution
mechanisms in their generic forms. One of them, ’pur-
chase & assumption’ provides an orderly way to close a
defaulting institution. This will be compared to bail-out
and bail-in resolution mechanisms, respectively, both en-
suring a survival of the bank in distress. We assume that
the resolution mechanisms will be enacted ’top-down’ by
a single resolution authority acting within a legal frame-
work which grants the required powers to the authority.
3Here we provide the rationale behind each crisis reso-
lution mechanism, their detailed model implementations
follow in section .
Purchase & Assumption. A ’purchase & assump-
tion’ (P&A) is a resolution mechanism which allows
for transferring the troubled bank’s operations to other,
healthy banks [20, 34]. The mechanism typically includes
the withdrawal or cancellation of the troubled bank’s li-
cense. Each of the other banks in the system purchases
parts of the failing bank’s assets and assumes its liabili-
ties. Here we assume that the volume of the asset pur-
chase for each bank is proportional to the value of the
purchasing bank’s liquid assets. Similarly, the assump-
tion of the troubled bank’s liabilities are proportional to
the assets taken over. Note that there exists a finance
gap since the total asset values will be smaller than the
combined value of the liabilities. This gap will be closed
by the banks which take over the troubled banks, since
they get more liabilities than assets in the procedure de-
scribed above. Therefore the losses of the failing bank
will effectively be paid by the other banks. The main
difference between a liquidation and a P&A is that un-
der liquidation the assets of a liquidated institution are
sold over time to pay its liabilities to depositors, whereas
in the P&A assets and liabilities are transferred to other
banks. An advantage of a P&A is that there is no need to
impose a process to pay out depositors of a failing bank.
Since the deposits are transferred to a healthy institu-
tion depositors may access their accounts without delay
at each stage of the resolution. Due to these reasons a
P&A is typically considered more efficient than a liqui-
dation [20], it will be used here as the standard way to
close down an institution.
Bail-out. A bail-out usually describes giving a loan
to a financially distressed institution or country which is
deemed healthy enough to survive after recapitalization
[35]. Another reason to bail out an institution may be
to minimize contagion risks of the insolvency of a large
and interconnected, i.e. systemically important, finan-
cial institution. We are interested in the case where the
loan is not provided by a private investor, for example
by buying floundering stocks of a company at firesale-
prices, but by a government at the expense of taxpayers’
interests. In exchange for providing funds, the govern-
ment typically receives preferred stock and therefore cash
dividends over time, which are used to protect the tax-
payers’ money. The government effectively becomes the
owner of the taken-over institution whose common stock
equity will be canceled (i.e. shareholders lose their invest-
ment), but the claims of debtors and depositors will be
protected. The use of bail-out resolution mechanisms has
been highly controversial. The existence of government-
sponsored safety nets may actually work as an incentive
for institutions to take financial risks, since in case of
failure they will be bailed out anyhow – the problem of
moral hazard [6]. Another criticism involves the high
costs typically involved in bail-outs [6]. In a sample of
bail-outs in 40 different countries the average cost of a
typical bank bail-out was estimated to be 12.8% of GDP
[35]. Especially after the 2008 financial crisis, interest
in alternative and cheaper crisis resolution mechanisms
which do not require taxpayer involvement surged.
Bail-in. As opposed to a bail-out, a bail-in forces
the creditors of the troubled financial institutions to bear
some of the financial burden [5–7]. The claims of typi-
cally unsecured debt holders are written off in a bail-in
and/or converted into equity to recapitalize the failing
institution. The bail-in instrument therefore provides a
private sector funded resolution mechanism as opposed
to government-funded solutions like bail-outs. The legal
framework for such top-down balance sheet restructuring
was provided in the US by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform in 2010, and in UK under the 2009 Banking Act
[36]. In the Eurozone there is currently no legal frame-
work for bail-ins. The first realization of a bail-in took
place in the Cypriot banking crisis 2012/2013. Conse-
quently there is relatively little experience in the long-
time consequences of this resolution mechanism. How-
ever, the perceived success of the Cyprus episode led the
head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, Jeroen Dijs-
selbloem, to state that the Cyprus deal may serve as a
template for future crisis resolutions [1].
AGENT-BASED MODEL
We study the performance of the crisis resolution
mechanisms using the Mark I CRISIS model. This is
one of a suite of models developed within the CRISIS
project on the basis of an agent-based macro-economic
model [29–31]. The Mark I CRISIS model consists of a
coupled economic and financial ABM which is closed, i.e.
there are no in-flows and out-flows of any kind of capi-
tal. Banking crises can thus not be resolved by simply
printing new money – some agents have to actually pay
for the losses. A similar version of the Mark I CRISIS
framework has recently been used to study the implemen-
tation of a taxation scheme for interbank transactions in
order to eliminate or reduce systemic risk [22]. For a
more comprehensive description of the coupled economic-
financial simulator see [22]. In the following we provide
an overview of the agents and their interaction mecha-
nisms, and list the changes with respect to previous ver-
sions of the CRISIS model. The model contains three
types of agents: households, banks, and firms. Agents
interact on various markets. Households and firms inter-
act on the job and consumption-good market, banks and
firms interact on the credit market, banks interact on the
interbank market.
Households. There are two types of household
agents, namely I firm owners and J workers. Each worker
applies for a job at z different firms in one model time-
4step. Once hired, he/she receives a fixed income w per
time-step for supplying fixed labor productivity α. The
workers deposit their income at one of the B banks. The
banks where a given worker opens his/her deposit are
randomly chosen in the model initialization and remain
fixed throughout time (unless the bank is closed under
a P&A). Each worker j has a personal account PAj,b(t)
at bank b. Each of the I firm owners owns exactly one
firm, and both the firms and their owner are indexed
by i. They also have a personal account PAi,b(t) at a
randomly chosen bank b. At each time step each house-
hold – worker or firm owner – computes its consumption
budget as a fixed percentage c of its personal account. It
spends cPAi/j,b(t) on the cheapest single product it finds
by comparing products from z randomly chosen firms.
Firms. There are I firms, all producing a perfectly
substitutable good. Each firm is owned by a single firm
owner, and each firm owner always owns not more than
one firm. At each time step the firms have to decide on
two quantities, their expected demand di(t), and their
expected price for the produced product, pi(t). Let
p¯(t) denote the average weighted price over all products,
p¯(t) =
∑
i pi(t)di(t)∑
i di(t)
. They compute the demand and price
by taking into account the previous demand di(t − 1)
and price pi(t − 1). If the firm sold all of its goods at
the previous time step, it either increases the price (if
pi(t− 1) < p¯(t− 1)), or increases its expected demand if
pi(t− 1) ≥ p¯(t− 1). If the demand at the previous time
step was lower than expected, the firm either reduces the
price (if pi(t − 1) > p¯(t − 1)), or decreases the expected
demand if pi(t − 1) ≤ p¯(t − 1). In all other cases the
expected demand and price do not change. Each firm
computes the number of required workers to achieve the
desired demand, always assuming that each worker sup-
plies labor productivity α. If the wages for this workforce
exceed the firm’s current liquidity, it applies for a credit.
On the credit market firms approach z randomly chosen
banks and choose the credit offered at the lowest rate. If
the real interest rate exceeds a threshold rate rmax, the
firm’s credit demand contracts to φ percent of the original
loan volume. After the loan is provided, firms recompute
their desired workforce and hire or fire workers in order to
meet the expected demand. The newly produced goods
are then sold on the consumption goods market. A firm
with positive profit pays out δ percent of the profit as
dividend to its owners. If a firm has negative liquidity
after the consumption good market closes, the firm owner
may provide the missing cash from his/her personal ac-
count. If these funds are smaller than the liquidity gap,
the firm goes bankrupt. The firm owner is held liable and
his/her personal account is used to partly pay off debtors
(banks), which incur a capital loss in proportion to their
investment. Finally, the firm owner immediately starts
a new company with di(t) = 〈di(t)〉i and pi(t) = 〈pi(t)〉i
being equal to their current population average.
Banks. Banks are subject to capital requirements,
their leverage must not exceed a given value λmax; they
have to maintain a cash reserve ratio of at least κmin.
Each bank b offers each firm i a loan at rate rb,i based
on i’s leverage li(t) (the quotient of i’s outstanding debt
and its cash),
rb,i = r0(1 + ) [1 + tanh(µli(t))] , (1)
where r0 is the refinancing rate, µ is a constant, and
 is a random number drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion between zero and one. The nominal market interest
rate i(n)(t) in the model is given by i(n)(t) =
∑
i,b rb,iLb,i∑
i,b Lb,i
,
where Lb,i denotes the loan volume provided from bank
b to firm i at rate rb,i. CV (t) denotes the total amount
of outstanding loans from all banks at a given time t. As
long as the banks have enough liquidity and fulfill their
capital requirements, they always grant the requested
loans. If they do not have enough cash, they approach
z randomly chosen other banks and try to get the miss-
ing amount from them. Banks always grant interbank
loans at a rate r(ib) when requested, given that they have
enough cash and fulfill the capital requirements. If a bank
does not have enough cash and is unable to get the re-
quired funds from other banks, it does not pay out the
loan. Each time step firms reimburse τ percent of their
outstanding debt. In case the banks make a profit, they
pay out δ percent of the profit as dividends. If a bank’s
equity becomes negative it is insolvent and undergoes one
of three possible crisis resolution mechanisms, (i) P&A,
(ii) bail-out, (iii) or bail-in.
The model interactions are summarized in figure 1A.
Firms pay households wages or dividends, households
consume goods produced by the firms. Both firms and
households make deposits at the banks. The banks grant
loans to the firms. In each time-step the model consists
of the following sequence of steps.
1. Firms define their labor demand and seek loans
from banks.
2. Banks raise liquidity on the interbank market to
service the loans to firms.
3. Firms hire or fire workers and produce goods.
4. Workers receive wages, spend their consumption
budget on goods and save the remainder.
5. Firms pay out dividends, firms with negative cash
go bankrupt.
6. Banks and firms repay loans.
7. Illiquid banks seek funds on the interbank market,
insolvent banks are resolved.
Crisis resolution mechanisms in the model.
Bank b goes bankrupt if its equity Eb(t) becomes nega-
tive by an amount of −Mb, Eb(t) ≡ −Mb < 0. The three
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FIG. 1: (A) The three sets of agents (households, firms, and banks) and their most important interactions are shown. Firms
and households interact on the consumer-goods and job market, firms and banks on the credit market. Households and firms
deposit their income with banks. The flows of funds in the CRISIS macro-financial model are shown in blue. Panels (B-D)
show the flows of funds taking place in crisis resolutions as red arrows. The troubled bank b is positioned in the middle of each
panel. (B) Healthy banks purchase b’s assets and assume its liabilities. (C) Households and firms bail out b using tax money.
(D) A bail-in with a debt-to-equity conversion with b’s debtors takes place.
different crisis resolution mechanisms are implemented in
the following way.
P&A The normalized weight vector wi,
∑
i wi = 1 is
constructed where the index i runs over all banks
with positive equities, i.e. healthy banks. The en-
tries in wi are proportional to the banks’ equities.
Each healthy bank takes over a share proportional
to wi of the resolved bank’s interbank loans and
firm loans. The household deposits are also trans-
ferred from the failing to the healthy banks. Each
deposit is transferred to bank i with probability
wi. The flows of funds involved in the P&A are
sketched in figure 1B.
Bail-out The normalized weight vector wi runs over all
households and firms and has entries proportional
to the households’ personal accounts PAj,b(t) and
the firms’ cash Ci(t). If deposit insurance is in
place we set wi = 0, given that the accounts or the
firm’s cash is smaller than ζ max [PAj,b(t), Ci(t)],
with the deposit insurance parameter 0 ≤ ζ < 1.
Then a one-time bank deposit levy wi(Mb + m) is
transferred from the households and firms to the
bailed out bank, where m is an overhead to ensure
that the bank has enough equity to resume oper-
ations after the bail-out. The previous owners of
b lose their investment and firms and households
receive an ownership share of wi percent of bank b.
The flows involved in a bail-out are summarized in
figure 1C.
Bail-in A bail-in implements a debt-to-equity conver-
sion. We assume that the resolution authority seeks
to protect depositors as far as possible. Therefore
an amount Mb + m from the claims from other
banks are converted into bank b’s equity first, where
again m is an overhead to ensure that the b can
continue its operations after the bail-in. Only if
these funds do not suffice we impose a one-time
bank deposit levy following the rules specified un-
6der bail-out, but with wi being non-zero only if the
levied deposit is with bank b. In return, ownership
rights are transferred to the agents which bailed in
the troubled bank, with the prospect of future div-
idend payments. The flows of funds involved in a
bail-in are shown in figure 1D.
RESULTS
A MatLab implementation of the Mark I CRISIS
model is used and extended by the described crisis resolu-
tion mechanisms. Some of the model parameters are kept
fixed, as listed in supporting table SI. To estimate the ro-
bustness of the results we are interested in two different
settings (1 and 2) of the remaining parameters listed in
supporting table SII.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the model dynamics
and shows that stylized empirical facts found in real
economies are reproduced (see below). Simulations were
performed with parameter setting 1 and a start equity
for banks of Eb(0) = 50. Figure 2A shows the Output
Y (t), which represents the combined value of all pro-
duced goods per time step as a function of time. Re-
sults are shown for the three different crisis resolution
methods (black for P&A, red for bail-out, and green for
bail-in), starting with the same initial random seed. At
about t = 2000 the first bank insolvency takes place,
and the outputs start to deviate from each other. Times
where at least one bank needs is financially distressed
are highlighted by vertical lines in the respective col-
ors. It becomes immediately apparent that details of
the model dynamics are sensitive to the choice of the res-
olution method, and that crises occur in bursts. Time
periods with a large number of bankruptcies alternate
with phases of stability.
The emergent firm sizes Ci are measured as total asset
value, unemployment U(t) as the percentage of unem-
ployed workers in the given time step, and inflation pi(t) is
given by the change in retail price index pi(t) ≡ p¯(t)p¯(t−1)−1.
Values have been taken in the time period before the
first banking crisis occurs. Figures 2B-D show the repro-
duction of several phenomenological laws found in real
economies. Figure 2B confirms a well known empirical
Zipf law in the distribution of firm sizes [38]. Figure 2C
shows Okun’s law [39] for the inverse relation between
unemployment change dU(t) = U(t)−U(t− 1), and pro-
ductivity change dY (t) = Y (t)−Y (t− 1). Finally, figure
2D shows the Philipp’s curve [40] as an inverse relation-
ship between unemployment U and inflation pi.
A central and extensively studied feature of the real
economy ABM employed in the CRISIS macro-financial
model is the existence of a first order phase transition
between economic states of low and high unemployment
[41]. This phase transition is closely related to the inter-
est rates in the model and, through that, to the refinanc-
ing rate r0. The interest rates for loans offered to firms
are roughly given by r0 plus a risk-dependent markup.
A discontinuity appears in the model once this rate ap-
proaches the firms’ credit contraction threshold, leading
to the phase transition [41]. We will therefore compare
the results for the different crisis resolution mechanisms
in three different interest rate regimes, the low interest
rate regime, i(n)(t) < rmax + pi(t), the critical regime,
i(n)(t) ≈ rmax + pi(t), and the high interest rate regime,
i(n)(t) > rmax+pi(t). Results are discussed for the unem-
ployment U , output Y , the combined outstanding credit
volume of firms CV , the interest rate i(n), and the aver-
age negative equity in banking crises, M = 〈Mb〉Eb(t)<0.
Here, 〈·〉Eb(t)<0 denotes the average over all occurrences
of a negative bank equity and hence the application of
one of the crisis resolution mechanisms. Let tf be the
time-step where only one bank is left in the P&A sce-
nario. Values have been averaged over 50 iterations and
the time-span starting from the first banking crisis until
t = min(tf , 1000). We can now focus on the question of
which crisis resolution mechanism shows the best perfor-
mance in terms of highest economic output, lowest un-
employment, and highest financial stability as measured
by funds required to save distressed financial institutions.
Results for U , Y , CV , i(n), and M for the generic cases
of r0 being below, at, or above the phase transition are
shown in figure 3A-C, respectively, for parameter setting
1. In figure S1 the case for setting 2 is shown. Figure 3
shows a spider plot for each interest rate regime where
each crisis resolution mechanism is displayed as a patch
(black for P&A, red for bail-out, green for bail-in) and
the area of the patch is proportional to the values of U , Y ,
CV , i(n), and M . Results for these parameters as a func-
tion of r0 are summarized in figure 2 for parameter setting
1, and for parameter setting 2 in supporting figure S3.
The findings are similar for both sets of parameters. The
left columns show U , Y , CV , i(n), and M as functions
of the refinancing rate r0 for the P&A scenario (black),
bail-out (red), and bail-in (green). The right columns in
figures S2 and S3 show the relative differences between
the crisis resolution mechanisms. If Z(c) is any observ-
able (such as U or Y ) under crisis resolution mechanism
c = 1, 2, 3, then ∆Z(c) is given by ∆Z(c) = Z(c)−〈Z(c)〉c,
i.e. the difference between the observed values and the
values averaged over all crisis resolutions c.
Low interest rate regime. For both parameter
settings the low interest rate regime can be found for
r0 < 0.025. Results are shown in figures 3A and S1A
for r0 = 0.021. Since r0 is below its critical value unem-
ployment U is practically zero under each crisis resolution
mechanism and values for the output Y are identical; the
economy is ’healthy’. However, the bail-out case shows a
slightly higher credit volume CV than the bail-in or P&A
cases. Since the firms share a higher burden of the finan-
cial losses in the bail-out case than in the other two cases,
they compensate for this by requesting higher loans from
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lines indicate that at least one bank’s equity become negative at this time. The model produces stylized empirical facts of real
economies, such as the (B) firm size distribution, (C) Okun’s law, and (D) Philipp’s curve.
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(B) Critical Interest Rate Regime
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(C) High Interest Rate Regime
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FIG. 3: The effects of the P&A scenario (black), bail-out(red) and bail-in (green) are shown for unemployment U , output
Y , credit volume CV , market interest rate i(n), and bank aid M for parameter setting 1 and three different interest rate
regimes. (A) In the low interest rate regime (r0 = 0.021) there is practically zero unemployment, high economic output, and
much higher costs associated with bail-outs and bail-ins as compared to the P&A case. (B) In the critical interest rate regime
(r0 = 0.027) the economy transitions from a healthy state of low unemployment to an unhealthy state of high unemployment
and recession. This transition sets in at lower interest rates in the P&A case compared to bail-outs and bail-ins. (C) The
high interest rate regime (r0 = 0.03) is characterized by low economic productivity at high unemployment. The bail-in crisis
resolution mechanism performs consistently better in term of output than its alternatives.
the banks. The market interest rates are higher in the
bail-out and bail-in case compared to the P&A scenario –
suggesting higher risk-dependent markups in the interest
rates offered to firms. A drastic difference can be seen
in the negative equities accumulated by the banks under
the three crisis resolution mechanisms. The value of M
is much lower in the P&A case compared to the bail-out
and bail-in scenario. This suggests that as banks become
larger by purchasing and assuming assets of other banks,
the risk for further financial losses in the low interest
8rate regime is greatly reduced. This is seen in equation
1, where low interests imply a low number of firm de-
faults which can be more effectively absorbed by larger
banks.
Critical interest rate regime. The critical inter-
est rate regime is found for 0.025 < r0 ≤ 0.027, see
figures 3B and S1B for r0 = 0.027. Here the onset of
the phase transition can be observed, i.e. unemployment
becomes non-zero output decreases. In the bail-out and
bail-in case this onset is at substantially higher values of
r0 than for the P&A scenario. All parameter values are
nearly identical for bail-outs and bail-ins, the output Y
is higher compared to the P&A case due to the later on-
set of the phase transition. In this regime the households
and firms have still enough wealth to bail-out (or bail-in)
banks without leading to a decrease in economic activity.
However, if banks default in this regime and the financial
sector has to absorb these losses (as in the P&A case),
this reduces the credit supply compared to the bail-out
and bail-in case. Consequently, there is less economic
activity and smaller output Y in the P&A case.
High interest rate regime. The high interest rate
regime is given by r0 > 0.027 for both parameter settings,
see figures 3C and S1C for r0 = 0.03. Unemployment
soars far above 20% and output drastically declines; the
economy has transitioned into an ’unhealthy’ state, a re-
cession. At the point r0 = 0.027 two crossovers occur.
Output and unemployment for bail-in and bail-out be-
gin to diverge, with bail-in having higher output at lower
unemployment, and the nominal interest rates approach
the same value for all three resolution mechanisms. For
higher values of r0 the bail-in strategy consistently out-
performs both bail-out and P&A in terms of output Y .
The credit supply in the P&A case is even smaller than
in the critical interest rate regime. The costs M are com-
parable in both scenarios. At the crossover at r0 = 0.027
the financial burden on households and firms reaches a
point where economic activity is impaired stronger in the
bail-out case than for bail-ins. In the high interest rate
regime firms and households have not enough savings to
assist distressed banks without causing a substantial de-
cline in consumption or production. Since in the bail-in
case only a small set of firms and households need to
absorb the financial losses, the remaining parts of the
economy perform better than in the bail-out case.
DISCUSSION
In this work we quantified the economic performance of
three different crisis resolution mechanisms which played
a pivotal role in the resolution of banking crises in the
recent past. The main difference between these mecha-
nisms is whether the troubled bank is closed down or not,
and which sector of the economy has to bear the major
burden of the financial losses inflicted by the banking cri-
sis. Under the P&A resolution mechanism the distressed
bank is closed and its assets and liabilities are purchased
and assumed by healthy banks, which thereby pay for the
losses. In a bail-out the financial burden is carried by the
taxpayers, in the bail-in the burden is distributed among
the troubled banks’ debtors. We tested the performance
of these resolution mechanisms within the framework of
the Mark I CRISIS model, an ABM equipped with cou-
pled economic and financial sectors.
The performance of the resolution mechanisms is
closely related to the state of the model economy, i.e.
whether interest rates are high or low. We found that
the P&A mechanism performs best in a regime where
unemployment is low and economic output high, i.e. the
economy is ’healthy’. While in terms of economic pro-
ductivity there is almost no difference between the dif-
ferent resolution mechanisms, the orderly liquidation of
the distressed bank leads to substantially smaller losses
to other banks and therefore increased financial stability
compared to bail-outs or bail-ins. This is because the
P&A case resolution mechanism leads to larger banks
which can absorb the – in the low interest rate regime –
comparably small losses due to firm defaults much more
effectively than banks which are drip-fed by bail-ins or
bail-outs. However, in the recession regime, characterized
by high unemployment and comparably low economic
productivity, this does not hold. In this regime the bail-in
mechanism outperforms both the P&A and the bail-out
mechanism in terms of higher economic output and sta-
bility. Here the banking sector alone can no longer cope
with the increasing number of firm defaults and credit
supply dwindles under the P&A mechanism. In the bail-
in case the financial losses are absorbed by, and confined
to a smaller part of the economy, the remaining parts of
the economy perform better than in the bail-out case. In
the intermediate economic state between the healthy and
unhealthy, bail-outs and bail-ins lead to almost the same
results and both outperform the P&A mechanism. In
this case the households and firms are wealthy enough to
allocate funds to troubled financial institutions without
reducing productivity and consumption.
A number of questions and further research agendas
immediately arise as a consequence of this work. First,
it remains to be seen how the results depend on the ac-
tually imposed liquidation procedure. In the P&A case
the number of banks decreases over time and we stop the
simulation if only one bank is left. It is interesting to
see what happens if we re-populate the financial sector
with new banks? The evolutionary perspective of having
competing banks with different strategies or even regu-
latory regimes also remains to be explored. Further, it
would be interesting to investigate a mix of resolution
mechanisms. For example, banks could be only partially
liquidated or only if certain conditions are met, such as
the bank being small enough. How do our results depend
on the choice of the economic production model? What
9if, instead of the Mark 1 economic model, firms are en-
dowed with capital and labor and produce goods accord-
ing to a Cobb-Douglas function or, say, the AK growth
model? Does this impact the performance of the resolu-
tion mechanisms? It will be possible to study these and
related questions in the future where the CRISIS frame-
work, which provides a suite of economic and financial
model building-blocks which can be plugged together and
extended. So far, our main results are obtained within
the cosmos of the Mark 1 CRISIS model: We showed
that (i) it is beneficial to let distressed banks default
only if the overall state of the economy is healthy enough
and (ii) there are no economic conditions under which a
taxpayer-funded bail-out outperformed the bail-in mech-
anism with private sector involvement.
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TABLE I: Overview and description of fixed model parameter.
Symbol Parameter Value
B number of banks 20
I number of firms 100
J number of worker 700
Eb(0) banks’ start equity 10
α labor productivity 0.1
w wage 1
z number of applications in consumption good or credit market 2
κmin minimal cash reserve ratio 0.005
λmax maximal leverage ratio 100
τ debt reimbursement rate 0.05
µ interest rate coefficient 0.2
rmax credit contraction threshold 0.05
r(ib) interbank loan interest rate 0
TABLE II: Overview and description of variable model parameter.
Symbol Parameter Setting 1 Setting 2
δ dividends 0.25 0.5
φ credit contraction parameter 0.75 0.8
c propensity to consume 0.85 0.8
m crisis resolution overhead 1 0.5
ζ deposit insurance 0.0 0.05
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(B) Critical Interest Rate Regime
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(C) High Interest Rate Regime
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FIG. 1: Same as figure 3 for parameter setting 2.
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FIG. 2: Effects of the P&A scenario (black), bail-out(red) and bail-in (green) are shown for (left column) unemployment U ,
output Y , credit volume CV , market interest rate in, and bank aid M as functions of r0 for parameter setting 1. The right
column shows the relative differences across different crisis resolution mechanisms for these parameters. In the low interest
rate regime (r0 < 0.025, indicated by the first vertical gray patch) there is practically zero unemployment, high economic
output, and much higher costs associated with bail-outs and bail-ins as compared to the P&A case. In the critical interest rate
regime 0.025 < r0 < 0.027 the economy transitions from a healthy state of low unemployment to an unhealthy state of high
unemployment. This transition sets in at lower interest rates in the P&A case compared to bail-outs and bail-ins. The high
interest rate regime (r0 > 0.027, given by the second vertical gray patch) is characterized by low economic productivity at high
unemployment. The bail-in crisis resolution mechanism performs consistently better in term of output than its alternatives.
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FIG. 3: Same as figure 2 for parameter setting 2. All observations and findings from setting 1 apply here too.
